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ABSTRACT: This paper will initially explore the assumptions about dissensus and consensus embedded in
the values of cultures such as the dimension of individualism/collectivism. This will lead into an examination
of how the emerging ideas about cultural forms of argument relate to dissensus and consensus in cultural
practices. Finally, the paper will explore the ways that argument as dissensus can bridge the gap between
cultural values and practice.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the concepts of con/dissensus in the argument process and the dimensions of cultural value variation. To carry out
this purpose, seven steps will be necessary: 1) an examination of what dissensus means
and what we know about it, 2) the development of a brief rationale for the study of
dissensus in the context of argument and cultural variation, 3) a brief explanation of the
conceptual approaches to the systematic variation of cultures, 4) an examination of the
assumptions about the con/dis-sensus process and argument embedded in standard
dimensions of cultural value variations, 5) the formulation of a strategy for studying the
relationship between argument and culture, 6) an examination of how argument and the
process of con/dis-ssenus works in cross-cultural conflict situations and 7) some
conclusions about the relationship between argument, the process of con/dis-sensus, and
the dimensions of cultural value variations.
Most discussions about dissensus in the argument process have occurred in the
West and in the context of the public sphere (Willard, 1987). In addition, treatments of
dissensus have usually treated it as a universal value especially in the sense of what
“should” be done in public life, which implies that the operation of the public sphere is
best when disagreement occurs. However, the fact that dissensus as a process seems to be
most prevalent in and works best in the context of Western cultural values, raises a number
of questions about the relationship between culture and dissensus. Does this mean that
argument as dissensus does not exist in other cultures, that it has been overlooked or that it
takes on other forms? Therefore, it is of importance to look at the relationship between the
con/dis-sensus process, argument, and the dimensions of cultural variation.
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1.

WHAT IS DISSENSUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGUMENT?

For theoretical, etymologically and stylistic reasons, the phrase con/dis-sensus will be used
to refer to the process of disagreement and agreement in argument. Use of the word
“dissensus” is relatively rare in everyday language and thus does not appear in most
dictionaries. Its roots are in Latin (via French) and related etymologically to the word
“consensus.” Since in both cases, the Latin is a compound of a prefix and the same root, it
is plausible to join the two words in a short-hand way. Furthermore, it makes conceptual
sense to combine these two terms because, in argument, they are, theoretically, the
opposite ends of the same continuum. The advantage of such a construction is that it
emphasizes their theoretical joining in the argumentation literature and provides greater
clarity when the discussion focuses on the process.
The term “dissensus” is not a common word in everyday usage, even in the field of
argumentation. Therefore, it is useful to outline the parameters of its meaning and a logical
starting point is with its dictionary definitions. There are few dictionary definitions of
dissensus, so it is easier to start with its conceptual opposite, “consensus.” The Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) defines ‘consensus’ as “agreement in opinion” or more
specifically, “the collective unanimous opinion of a group of people” (1971, p. 523). The
OED does not provide a definition for ‘dissensus,’ but Webster’s New Millennium
Dictionary of English defines it in two ways: “widespread dissent” and “difference of
opinion” (Kipfer 2003-2006). These definitions seem to provide two levels of
differentiation for the conceptual opposites, consensus/dissensus. First, they suggest a
threshold definition which simply focuses on whether there is any agreement or
disagreement present in the situation. Second, they suggest a stronger definition of the
concept when they indicate that a substantial group of people are in agreement or have a
difference of opinion as in “widespread,” “a group of people” or even the “collective
unanimous opinion” (however this unaniminity is not suggested for the dissent), thus
defining consensus and dissensus in terms of a substantial number, majority or unanimous
group. Thus, the dictionary definitions suggest that dissensus can be looked at as simply
the presence or absence of disagreement or as the number of people involved in agreeing
or disagreeing.
There are few research projects that have attempted to systematically explore the
concept of dissensus. In the literature on conflict in social interaction and groups, there is
a set of studies that explored the ideas of “conflict of interest” and “value dissensus”
(Druckman & Zechmeister 1970, 1973; Cosier & Dalton 1988). In these studies, value
dissensus is defined as “differences between parties in values or beliefs concerning the
same social object or objective” (Druckman & Zechmeister 1970, p. 431) and conflict of
interest (or competition) is defined as differences between people in preferred distributions
of some scarce resource. Thus, in this case, dissensus is associated with the more
intractable kind of conflict where the differences are the result of value disparities or what
they call, at one point, ideological orientation. Their general finding is that value dissensus
can lead to more intense and polarized, less satisfying, and less productive conflicts. These
studies use the word “dissensus” in the sense of a particular kind of disagreement, i.e. that
involving values or beliefs rather than some less intense object of focus. These studies
support a third dimension of meaning that is based on the object of disagreement.
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The one project in the field of argument that has attempted to apply the concept of
dissensus to argument is the Valuing Dissensus Project of Willard, Hynes, Willihnganz
and others. In Willard’s initial article, dissensus was defined simply as “conversation
involving disagreement” (1987, p. 145) and in his 1989 book, he speaks of “arguments [as]
conversations in which opposition is present” (p. 12). He also uses the term
interchangeably with words such as conflict, competition, strife, dissension and dissent.
Willard does place some limits on its application when he says that it is not just any
disagreement but needs to involve certain forms and processes to be successfully applied.
Furthermore, in an important footnote in his original article, he seems to limit its presence
to certain situations where he says that his project is focused on political and
organizational life and that he “wouldn’t extend [it] …intact to the interpersonal domain”
(1987, p. 157), however Hynes (1992) has suggested such an extension. By 1989, he
draws two other important formal limitations. First, that not all dissensus is argument
because there needs to be an understanding between the parties that there is a disagreement
and that it is acknowledged in some way (explicit or implicit) in the interaction (p. 53 &
66). And second, dissensus should not be thought of as just any form of disagreement such
as “disagreement for disagreement’s sake” or any other similar form of argumentativeness.
It is not an individualistic form of disputatiousness but instead requires a degree of
coorientation and interdependence to function properly (p. 149).
Throughout the discussions of dissensus, an increasing number of process
templates are added that are treated as essential to the “valuing” of dissensus. In his 1989
book, in discussing dissensus and rationality, Willard equates dissensus with social
comparison and idea-testing (p. 149) and at another point; he equates it with tolerance of
disagreement in organizations (p. 11). He further codifies these ideas when he discusses
dissensus in the context of “good will” and “playing by the rules’ (p. 150 & 236). The
result is that by 2001, the group goes so far as to argue that dissensus is “[n]ot just any
disagreement…[but]valuing dissensus requires a high degree of professionalism and
dispassion in tandem with a commitment to shared procedural rules” (Willihnganz, Hart &
Willard 2001, p. 147).
The process of valuing dissensus is more complicated than just random
disagreement or disagreement for disagreement’s sake. In a 1993 article, they argue that
the dissensus project as related to the structure of an organization involves interaction over
competing claims, the tension of ideas, and opportunities for collective disagreement
(Willihnganz, Seibert & Willard) and in 1991, Hynes outlined a series of ways that an
organization could institutionalize dissensus. The idea of dissensus has also been extended to
the public sphere (Hynes 1990) and democratization (Hynes 1992). In a 2001 article, they try
to integrate the dissensus project in organizations with O’Keefe’s theory of Message
Design Logic by arguing that a person displaying expressive Message Design Logic (MDL)
(communicating to express their own thoughts and feelings despite the context) is not
constructively contributing to the dissensus process in organizations even though a person
employing conventional MDL or rhetorical MDL can make a constructive contribution.
Thus, Willard’s project begins with a plea for valuing dissensus in political and
organizational life in the form of disagreement but soon goes on to outline a series of
delimiting conditions for dissensus argument and a process that can maximize the values of
dissensus in organizations and public life.
At this point, we can see four ways of understanding dissensus and consensus: 1) the
conceptual distinction between people’s agreement and disagreement, 2) the quantitative
3
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distinctions involved in specifying the number of people involved in the agreement or
disagreement, 3) the object or topic that the agreement or disagreement is focused on, and
4) a series of situational and procedural rules for the process.
Finally, Rossi & Berk (1985) have suggested some further distinctions about
varieties of consensus and dissensus in the realm of sociological norms where they
distinguish between four dimensions of dissensus. The first dimension, strength of domain
structure, has to do with the degree of clarity among the disputants about what the focus of
agreement or disagreement is. The second dimension, threshold differences, has to do with
the degree of agreement or disagreement about the importance of the issues under
discussion. The third dimension, domain dissensus, has to do with the agreement or
disagreement about whether the issues are ones of kind or degree. The fourth dimension,
segmentation of dissent, has to do with whether there are any clear socio-demographic
distinctions between the groups agreeing or disagreeing.
In summary, the four sources discussed suggest a taxonomy of meaning dimensions
for the idea of con/dis-sensus (Figure 1). Under the first dimension, the nature of the
disagreement, there is an increasing level of complexity involved in the nature of the
disagreement. It begins with the threshold idea of whether any disagreement is present,
which comes both from the dictionary definition and Willard’s work. The next level,
concerning the object or topic of disagreement, comes from the work on group conflict and
the remaining three items concerning clarity, importance, and degree v. kind come from
Rossi and Berk’s discussion. The second dimension of meaning, having to do with the
amount of disagreement and whether the disagreement is segmented along the lines of any
existing groups, comes from the dictionary definitions and from Rossi and Berk’s work,
respectively. The third dimension concerning spheres and the fourth dimension concerning
the nature of the interaction come from the Valuing Dissensus Project.
Before the relationship between dissensus and cultural variations can be addressed,
it is necessary to draw one more distinction that is present in the Valuing Dissensus Project;
namely that between the descriptive and the normative. Much of the literature on
dissensus is couched in normative language. Thus, Willard (1987) in his original article
argues that “dissensus should be seen as an end in itself,” that argument should be defined
in terms of dissensus, and that it should be promoted as a political principle, i.e. should be
valued societally (p. 145). However, there is also the question of the degree to which
dissensus is practiced in a particular society? Thus, it will be necessary to examine the
question of how much and in what ways dissensus is practiced in other societies before
addressing the second question of how much dissensus is or should be valued in other
societies? However, it should be realized that the idea of cultural value dimensions often
has as much to do with what “should be” as “what is.”
2.
WHY STUDY DISSENSUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGUMENT AND
CULTURAL VARIATION?
Willard in his original essay argued that dissensus should be an end in its own right and
valued just as much by a society as consensus is valued. While this initial position seemed
to privilege disagreement for its own sake, in reality, it proved to be more of a rhetorical
flourish.
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FIGURE 1
DIMENSIONS OF MEANING FOR DISSENSUS
1.

NATURE OF THE DISAGREEMENT
A.
Threshold: Is there any disagreement present?
B.
Object/Topic: What are the objects or topics of disagreement in the
discussion?
C.
Clarity: To what degree are the parties clear about what is being disagreed
on?
D.
Importance of the Issues: Is there agreement or disagreement about the
importance of the issues?
E.
Kind or Degree: Is there agreement or disagreement about whether the
differences are of kind or degree?

2.

NUMBER OF ENTITIES OR GROUPS DISAGREEING
A.
Size of disagreement among the entities: How many or what percentage of
the people disagree?
B.
Segmentation of Entities: Are there any clear socio-demographic
distinctions between the groups disagreeing?

3.

SPHERE
A.
Sphere: What is the sphere or situation in which there is discussion?

4.

INTERACTIVE ASPECTS OF DISAGREEMENT
A.
Presence of Disagreement in the Interaction
1.
Is there any disagreement acknowledged in the interaction?
2.
Is the object/topic, importance, clarity, or degree of disagreement
acknowledged in the interaction?
B.
Relational Aspects of the Interaction
1.
Is there good will toward the others in the interaction?
2.
Is there professionalism and dispassion in the interaction?
3.
Is there a degree of coorientation and interdependence in the
interaction?
4.
Is there tolerance of disagreement in the interaction?
C.
Task Aspects of the Interaction
1.
Is there social comparison and idea testing in the interaction?
2.
Is there interaction over competing claims?
3.
Is there tension of ideas in the interaction?
4.
Are there opportunities for collective disagreement in the interaction?
D.
Structural Aspects of the Interaction
1.
Do the parties play by the rules in the interaction?
2.
Is there a commitment to shared procedural rules in the interaction?
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The question of why we should value dissensus by itself still remains and over time,
several reasons have emerged. First, it is argued that dissensus leads to better decisions in
that it mitigates against things such as group think. The insistence on disagreement is seen
as insuring that a range of alternatives are given full consideration. The implication is that
once all of the alternatives are fully considered, then the best decision is made. This
position is backed by evidence in several fields (group conflict, group decision-making,
and organizational decision-making) that dissensus can lead to better decisions.
The value of a range of viewpoints for effective decision-making would seem to be
a truism but Willard and associates argue that “the primary reason for valuing dissensus,
then, is to create a countervailing influence for movements toward completion and
sameness” (Willihnganz, Seibert & Willard 1993, p. 202). They believe that the literature
on organizational cultures fosters an atmosphere of sameness that eventually makes the
organization dysfunctional.
It should be noted that if dissensus was to be valued in itself, then if there had been
a full consideration of the arguments and a decision had been made, disagreement would
be expected to still continue, which does not seem to be Willard’s position.
Second, it also has been argued that in organizations that are increasingly
multicultural, dissensus is important to insure that groups are not marginalized and
everyone can participate in decision-making. The Valuing Dissensus Project argues that
“organizations need the benefits of considering multiple perspectives, hearing differing
arguments, and entertaining the possibility of different actions and conclusions if they are
to make decisions to sustain themselves in turbulent and changing times” (Willihnganz,
Seibert & Willard 1993, p. 201).
Third, one could also argue for the importance of dissensus as a normative
principle, namely that of freedom of expression as an inherent human right. The rights to
speak, to expression one’s self and to disagree are seen as rights espoused in various
documents of the United Nations and other organizations.
Fourth, it is also argued by some that dissensus is an aspect of human nature.
Burke (1969), in his dramatistic theory, sees two fundamental principles working in human
affairs; namely those of unity and division. These are the two same processes involved in
the argumentative con/dis-sensus process.
Finally, as has been previously mentioned, a strong argument can be made for the
study of dissensus in non-Western cultures. Since most of the theory and research about
argument and disagreement has its origins in the West, there are important questions about
its applicability to other cultures with different value structures. For example, is
disagreement in the argument process equally acceptable in all cultures?
3. WHAT ARE THE PATTERNS AND DIMENSIONS OF CULTURAL VARIATION?
Having gained some understanding of the different dimensions involved in the con/dissensus process, it is now necessary to gain a similar understanding of the nature of cultural
variations. The question of how to explain similarities and differences between cultures has
occupied scholars and disciplines for many a century, so there is no lack of material on, or
approaches to, the subject. However, the question is how can we best approach patterns of
cultural variation so as to relate them to dissensus and argument?
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In Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett’s (1998) review of approaches to the study
of the relationship between cultures and cognitions, their classification systems of
approaches to cultural variation can be thought of as a starting point. The two simplest
approaches, the focus on universals and the idea of relativizing particularism, are to some
degree mirror opposites of each other. For a long time, the study of cultures was focused
on finding the universal commonalities between cultures (e.g. anthropology looked at
kinship; psychology at personalities; sociology at groups; communication at persuasion),
however, in recent years, the universal approach has been criticized on the basis of
descriptive research findings and of ideological assumptions. As a result, the pendulum has
swung to the opposite extreme of the relativizing particularism approach where everything
of importance is seen as different between cultures, i.e. particular and relative (Hazen 2006;
Hazen & Fourcade 2007). For our purposes, the problem with both of these approaches is
that they are extremes and are simplistic in their ways of dealing with cultures.
A third long standing approach is that of temporal sequences where cultures are
seen to follow a temporal pattern in their development (e.g. Marxism’s theory of the
progression of dialectical materialism; and modernization theory’s progression of
development processes). A more recent fourth approach looks at generative structures that
are seen as the key to the process of cultural similarities and differences (e.g. Chomsky’s
approach to language) and a fifth approach looks at cultural complexes around which
cultures are organized (e.g. kinship, bureaucracy).
While the temporal sequences, generative structures, and cultural complexes
approaches each has its own strength, they all can be subsumed under the sixth approach
that of cultural dimensions (typologies & dimensions). It has received the most attention
because: 1) it has proved to be the most heuristic in terms of research and theorizing, 2) it
has shown an ability to adapt and change, and 3) it represents the most common approach
to the question of cultural similarities and differences used by disciplines such as
psychology, anthropology, sociology, and communication.
There are at least three forms of the cultural dimensions approach that merit
attention. All of the forms are based on the assumption that a culture is best represented by
the values and beliefs that a group of people hold in common which are seen as being
related to other aspects of life. An approach to culture based on values and beliefs provides
a nice complement to the idea of communication and argument as behavioral processes
taking such forms as messages, interaction sequences, etc. Culture and communication can
then be studied as complementary and reciprocal processes.
The earliest of the approaches was developed by Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck (1961)
in their anthropological study of Southwestern United States’ Native American groups.
They concluded that there are an underlying set of questions that all humans face and that
there are a limited set of answers to the questions, which are reflected in the different
cultural value orientations. They suggested that these questions and value dimensions
focus on: 1) time, 2) the relationship between humanity and its natural environment, 3)
how humans relate to each other, 4) people’s primary motive for behavior, 5) the nature of
human beings and 6) space. While this taxonomy is rarely used today by itself, it has
heavily influenced the subsequent systems that have been developed.
The second approach is that of Schwartz, who developed his system out of the
work of Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck. Schwartz (1999) extended the values approach to
include ten individual values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction,
7
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universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity & security) and seven cultural values
(conservatism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism,
mastery & harmony) that can organize cultural similarities and differences.
The third approach was initially developed by Hofstede (1980) and was later
refined by Triandis (1988) and others. Hofstede (1980) in a multi-country study of IBM
employees found that cultures can be differentiated on the basis of four value dimensions:
1) individualism/collectivism (the degree to which individuals are autonomous from or
integrated into groups), 2) power distance (the degree to which people accept or do not
accept that power is unequally distributed), 3) uncertainty avoidance (the amount of
tolerance for or avoidance of uncertainty and ambiguity) and 4) masculinity/femininity (the
degree to which gender roles are set and males are assertive and competitive). Later on,
Hofstede added a fifth dimension, time orientation, based on the work of Bond.
Triandis (1988) has worked on several of Hofstede’s, and of Kluckhohn and
Stodtbeck’s dimensions but has especially concentrated on the individualism/ collectivism
dimension. He and his associates developed a number of measurement techniques for the
dimensions, provided evidence that individualism and collectivism are separate dimensions,
and added the ideas of a vertical (hierarchical) and a horizontal (egalitarianism) dimension
to the factors of individualism and collectivism (1995).
The newest development in this line of research is know as the GLOBE study
(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, Gupta 2004), which purports to be a study of
leadership, cultural value systems and organizations in 62 societies. The study measures 18
cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance practices and values, future orientation
practices and values, power distance practices and values, institutional collectivism
practices and values, humane orientation practices and values, performance orientation
practices and values, in-group collectivism practices and values, gender egalitarianism
practices and values, and assertiveness practices and values. As can be seen, they have
added a layer of data based on practices to go with the traditional layer of values. They
claim that seven of the dimensions come from Hofstede’s work, that the eighth, humane
orientation, comes from Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck’s, and that the ninth, performance
orientation, comes from McClelland’s work on achievement motivation. Hofstede’s
individualism/collectivism dimension is split into an in-group collectivism dimension and
an institutional collectivism dimension, while Hofstede’s masculinity/femininity
dimension is split into a gender egalitarianism dimension and an assertiveness dimension.
Hofstede (2006B) has replied to the GLOBE study, arguing that its dimensions are
not equivalent to his dimensions and that the GLOBE scales are not measuring what they
say that they are. Hofstede re-analyzed their data using factor analysis and argued that the
18 dimensions reduce to five meta-factors, three of which are related to his (Hofstede’s)
individualism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation scales. Parts of a fourth
dimension are related to his masculinity-femininity dimension and the fifth factor is
GNP/capita.
The relationship between the dimensions in the taxonomies developed by the
various scholars can be seen in Figure 2. Throughout the rest of this paper, the primary
focus will be on the dimension of individualism and collectivism because of its centrality
to the research on cultural variations. As will be seen, the distinctions between the different
dimensions often break down as they are conceptually refined. As a result, our discussions
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FIGURE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXONOMIES OF CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS
Kluckhohn
Hofstede
Triandis
Schwartz
GLOBE
& Stodtbeck
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Individualism Vertical Ind
Affective
Collectivism
Autonomy
In-Group
Humans
Horizontal Ind
Collectivism
Relate to
Intellectual
Each Other
Autonomy
Institutional
Vertical Coll
Collectivism
Conservativism
Power
Distance

Hierarchy
Horizontal Coll

Egalitarianism
Power Distance
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Relate to
Uncertainty
Mastery
(Nature)
Avoidance
Uncertainty
Harmony
Avoidance
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Gender
Activity
Masculinity
Egalitarianism
Orientation Femininity
Assertiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Time
Long/Short
Future
Orientation Term
Orientation
Orientation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nature of
Humaneness
Human Beings
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Space
Orientation
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Performance
Orientation
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of the relationship between con/dis-sensus and cultural variations will touch on a number
of the dimensions.
Finally, it should be mentioned here that the cultural values approach has been
criticized by some as reflecting a binary emphasis on cultural dichotomies (only two
opposition positions) which create rigid contrasts between cultures (Hermans & Kempen
1998). However, if Hofstede’s work is examined closely, it can be seen that he emphasized
from the beginning that the dimensions are continuums and that studies show that
individual countries are widely scattered on the continuum of each dimension thus
reflecting a number of finely nuanced differences. Other criticisms have focused on the
fact that there is variability on any particular dimension in a culture and that any individual
may not reflect the cultural value. Hofstede acknowledges all of these are limitations when
he talks about the cultural value ratings for countries as being aggregate numbers for the
hypothetical average citizen who may differ from any real individual (1991).
4. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CON/DISSENSUS PROCESS, ARGUMENT AND CULTURAL VARIATION?
Now that some understanding has been gained about both the meaning of the con/dissensus process and about the patterns of cultural variation, the next step is to look at the
con/dis-sensus process and cultural variation together. The following discussion is meant
to sketch the broad outlines of the generally accepted theoretical relationships between the
two phenomena.
4.1 What general links exist between cultural value variations and the con/dis-sensus
process?
A cursory look at the cultural value dimensions would seem to suggest a number with
relationships to the argumentative dimensions of consensus and dissensus. For example, in
Hofstede’s framework, there are hints of relationships to disagreement, particularly in the
questions used to measure the cultural value dimensions. Power distance has to do with the
willingness of people to accept power differences in their society, thus people who are in a
high power distance society are willing to defer to those in power, while those in a low
power distance society are not as willing to accept and defer to those with power.
Masculinity (and femininity) has to do with styles of interaction that embody the masculine
values of assertive, ambitious and competitive behavior (according to Hofstede).
Uncertainty avoidance has to do with people’s reactions to unstructured situations where a
high level of uncertainty avoidance can lead to a desire for strict codes of behavior and
adherence to them. Finally, individualism (and collectivism) asks whether persons see
themselves as integrated into and deferring to a group or as operating on their own and
relating to groups based on the person’s self-interests. For example, in discussing the
consequences of individualism for national structures, Hofstede sees high individualism as
providing room for protest, press freedoms, and defending one’s own interests (1980, p.
238).
Triandis, in extending the conceptualization of individualism and of collectivism,
integrates power distance into the formulation by creating the idea of vertical (hierarchical)
and horizontal (egalitarian) forms of individualism and collectivism. He starts by linking
10
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individualism to self-reliance and collectivism to in-group harmony. In his various
measurement scales associated with the different value systems, the apparent roles for
dissensus and consensus can be seen in the wording of the items: horizontal-individualism
“I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people”; vertical individualism “I
enjoy working in situations involving competition with others”; horizontal collectivism “It
is important to maintain harmony within my group”; vertical collectivism “I hate to
disagree with others in my group” (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk & Gelfand 1995, pp 255256).
Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002), in a massive review and meta-analysis
of the studies on individualism and collectivism, further reinforce such distinctions related
to the con/dis-sensus process when they mention contrasts between “restraint in emotional
expression, rather than open and direct expression of personal feelings” and between
“harmonious relationships with close others” rather than the independence of self (p. 5).
Furthermore, in their review of the various scales that have been used to measure
individualism and collectivism, they find that there have been seven individualism
components and eight collectivism components that account for 88% of all of the items in
the studies. Some of the components that are of interest here are: the individualism
domains of “compete” (“It is important to me that I perform better than others on a task”),
“direct communication (“I always state my opinions very clearly”), and “independent” (“I
tend to do my own thing, and others in my family do the same”); and the collectivism
domains of “harmony” (“I make an effort to avoid disagreements with my group
members”), “advice” (“Before making a decision, I always consult with others”) and
“hierarchy” (I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact”) (p. 9).
It is apparent from a cursory view that consensus and dissensus have a significant number
of echoes in the conceptual formulations of the various cultural value dimensions.
4.2 How does argument (communication) relate to cultural variation and the con/dissensus process?
The discussion up to this point has focused on cultural variations in values and their
apparent relationship to consensus and dissensus, however it is also clear that a lot of this
discussion uses examples that are illustrative of different communication styles (e.g. the
quotations on the previous page from Singelis et al, 1995 and Oyserman et al, 2002). It is
important to extend the correlations between culture value dimensions and the con/dissensus process to the level of interaction where argument actually occurs. This was
emphasized by Willard and his associates when they drew a distinction between dissensus
that is not argument because it is not actualized in interaction and dissensus which is
argument because it is situated in the argumentative (communication) process.
Correlations between argument and cultural value dimensions have been suggested
in the work of several researchers. For example, Gudykunst (1998) argues that “[t]here are
systematic variations in communication that can be explained by cultural differences in IC” [individualism-collectivism](p. 107). He goes on to argue that the correlations with
individualism and collectivism respectively can be seen in terms of low-context and highcontext communication (direct, explicit v. indirect, implicit), self-disclosure (differences in
in-group/out-group communication dimensions), uncertainty (differences in types of
uncertainty and uncertainty reduction processes), communication rules (for intergroup
11
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communication), face-negotiation (self-face v. other-face), turn-taking in conversations
(synchronization and length of turns), persuasive strategies (direct, individual v indirect,
group oriented), and conflict management (direct v indirect styles). If these correlations are
examined closely, it also will be seen that these communicative features provide a wealth
of argumentative resources for instantiating consensus and dissensus in many and varied
ways within particular cultural contexts.
Examples of the argument aspects of cultural variation can be seen in several
studies. Ng, Loong, He, Liu and Weatherall (2000) in looking at European and Chinese
family discussions in New Zealand, saw the emphasis on the individual in individualistic
cultures as encouraging “self-expression and speaking one’s mind freely” while the
adherence to the group in collectivistic cultures, “leads to self-censoring, and even
compromised talk, for the sake of maintaining social harmony.” (p. 27). They further
argued that “single-addressee turns have a relatively exclusive, individualistic focus…” [as
used in the European New Zealand families] while “multi-addressee turns that are directed
to two or more persons have a more inclusive, collectivistic focus” [as used in the Chinese
New Zealand families](p. 29).
Another example is provided by Moemeka (1996) who specifically looks at
communalistic societies in Africa and observes that personal matters and individual
grievances are not allowed to be voiced when they are in conflict with the community’s
interests. Furthermore, members of the community are not allowed to talk back to a leader
and even when they are called on to ‘speak their mind’ in open discussion of public issues,
their views and any expression of them became irrelevant when a decision has been made.
In a third study, Kim and Sherman (2007) looked at how people in individualistic
and collectivistic cultures value self expression. They found that in one study, European
American students were more likely to mention self expression of thoughts and feelings as
the reason for communicating than were Korean students (80% to 31%) while Koreans
were more likely to mention communication with others as the reason for communication
than were the European American students (68% to 39%). In a second study, they found
that European Americans were more likely to rate self-expression as more important than
East Asian Americans while the East Asian Americans were more likely to rate
interdependence with others higher than the European Americans.
Thus, examples of possible correlations between the con/dis-sensus process in
argument and cultural value variations can be seen in the literature on individualism and
collectivism (Figure 3). There is a general equation of individualistic cultural values with
forms of direct communication that often include disagreement (dissensus) and
collectivistic cultural values with forms of communication that emphasize the group and
preserve the harmony of the group (consensus). A similar analysis could be extended to
uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, and power distance.
5. WHAT IS A USEFUL STRATEGY FOR EVALUATING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE ARGUMENTATIVE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AND
CULTURAL VARIATION IN A DESCRIPTIVE SENSE?
So far, questions about argument and cultural variations have been addressed in only the
most general and theoretical terms. It is now necessary to look at the relationship between
argument and cultural value dimensions in a descriptive sense. The literature on cultural
12
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FIGURE 3
THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS,
THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AND ARGUMENT
CULTURAL VALUES
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variation is voluminous, even though the literature on argument and cultural variation is
limited, so a strategy is needed for exploring the role of argument in cultures.
A first step in a strategy is suggested by the fact that while there is not much
research on argument and cultural variations, there is a lot of literature on conflict and
cultural variations. Therefore, since there is a clear relationship between disagreement and
argument, and many theorists go on to define argument in terms of controversy (especially
when dealing with what O’Keefe calls argument2), it is a natural step to look at the
literature on conflict and cultural variation. However, since the literature on conflict and
even conflict and culture is large, it is advantageous to adopt further steps in our strategy.
A second step come from the fact that a clear theoretical connection has already
been established between argument and individualism (masculinity, low power distance
and low uncertainty avoidance), the more intriguing question has to do with the
relationship between argument and the cultural variation of collectivism in actual practice.
This is also of theoretical interest because most societies that have been labeled as
collectivistic are non-Western, which allows us to explore the charge that argument and
dissensus as presented in the argumentation literature are only a western phenomenon.
A third strategic step is to look at the underlying meanings of individualism and
collectivism. For example, recent research on cultural variations has led to the conclusion
that the simple continuum of individualism-collectivism of earlier research may be more
complex than originally thought. This new, more complex research about individualism
and collectivism goes beyond the simple relationships outline in Section 4 and opens up
new ways of thinking about the relationship between argument and individual/collectivism.
The fourth strategic step results from the fact that if the concepts of
individualism/collectivism are more complex, then questions about the placement of
particular countries on the individualism-collectivism continuum may need to be rethought. Furthermore, there is controversy about whether some countries have changed as
they have become more global and whether Hofstede’s categorizations still hold. In
examining the dynamics of conflict and argument in these “collectivistic” cultures, the lens
of con/dis-sensus may help us to better understand what is happening in these countries
because of the behavioral nature of argument.
Thus, our strategic approach suggests that we explore the relationship between
argument as expressed in the con/dis-sensus process and cultural variations within the
situational context of conflict as present and dealt with in countries labeled as collectivistic.
Furthermore, the placement of such countries and the exploration of the nature of
collectivism allows us to gain further insights into the ways that argument and dissensus
might function. Before exploring argument and cultural variation in the conflict situation,
it is useful to examine the last two steps in more detail because they represent alterations in
the relationships outlined in Section 4.
5.1 The complexities of individualism and collectivism as dimensions of variation in
cultural values.
One of the most significant developments in understanding variations in cultures, postHofstede, has been the realization that the concepts are more complex that simple
dichotomous continuums. This has been especially true in the case of individualismcollectivism but to a lesser degree with the other dimensions of cultural variation. For
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example, a study by Tyler, Lind and Huo (2000) suggest that there may be a similar
phenomenon going on with the dimension of power distance. In that study of power
distance and conflict resolution across cultures, there may be at least three parts to the
power distance dimension and one of them may relate directly to a subordinate’s comfort
level in disagreeing with their supervisor.
The following analysis will focus on individualism/collectivism but, as will be seen,
some aspects of the other dimensions of cultural variation will be referred to in the
discussion. First, an increasing amount of work has come to the conclusion that
individualism and collectivism are two separate dimensions of cultural variability. In
Hofstede’s original work, he only measured individualism and assumed that low
individualism equals collectivism. Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai and Lucca (1988)
in their work on individualism and collectivism found that the concepts were
multidimensional and that they were orthogonal (independent of each other). By 2002,
Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) in their meta-analyses of individualism and
collectivism were ready to conclude that individualism and collectivism are best thought of
as independent of each other and differentially triggered by contextual and social cues.
Schimmack, Oishi & Diener (2005) have recently attacked Oyserman, Coon &
Kemmelmeier’s (2002) findings because they did not adjust for national differences in
response styles in their meta-analysis. Hofstede (2006A) has also recently attacked
Oyserman et al on the basis of the Schimmack et al study, however Schimmack et al see
their criticism as focused on one question, that of convergent validity between Hofstede’s
scales and later forms of measurement, not on the issue of whether individualism and
collectivism are polar or orthogonal concepts.
Despite the conclusions of Triandis and Oyserman et al, many researchers still treat
Hofstede’s scales as a unidimensional measurement of individualism and collectivism or
worse yet, assume that a country is individualistic or collectivistic based on Hofstede’s
original measurements. The danger in this is illustrated in a recent study by Koch and
Koch (2007) where they examined the relationship of collectivism and individualism to
cooperative behavior in China. In exploring their findings, they took the original Hofstede
scales and factor analyzed them, which yielded two independent factors, of equal
weighting, one for individualism and one for collectivism. When they used these scales to
explain their results, they found that only the individualism factor was related to the
differences in cooperative behavior not collectivism. Thus, it is possible for both
collectivism and individualism to exist in a culture and in an individual.
The second significant development was Triandis’ work (1995; Singelis, Triandis,
Bhawuk & Gelfand 1995; Triandis & Gelfand 1998), where he overlaid individualism and
collectivism with a vertical (hierarchical) and a horizontal (egalitarian) dimension. For
Triandis, a vertical individualist culture is one where people see themselves as selfreliant/autonomous selves but allow for inequalities due to different status levels while a
horizontal individualist culture is one where people see themselves as selfreliant/autonomous selves who are similar and equal in status (egalitarian). A vertical
collectivist culture is one where people see themselves as part of an in-group where people
have different status levels while a horizontal collectivist culture is one where people see
themselves as part of an in-group and see each other as equal in status. This proposal when
combined with the conclusion that individualism and collectivism are independent
dimensions, results in a four-part categorization of aspects of individualism and
15

MICHAEL DAVID HAZEN
collectivism. The validity of this framework was illustrated in Gourveia, Clemente and
Espinosa’s (2003) study of individualism and collectivism in Spain, where they found the
same four part factor structure as proposed by Triandis.
A third set of developments comes from the research of Schwartz (1999), who
works out of similar traditions to Hofstede and Triandis but uses different labels for his
dimensions. He made two additions to our thinking by splitting individualism into
intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy and by adding a third dimension of
harmony/mastery of the natural and social world. Similar to earlier work by Kluckhohn
and Stodtbeck, he sees the dimensions of cultural variation as arising from a set of
fundamental questions: 1) what is the relationship between an individual and the group
(conservativism/intellectual & affective autonomy), 2) how to guarantee responsible social
behavior (hierarchy/ egalitarianism), and 3) what is the relation of people to the natural and
social worlds (mastery/harmony).
A fourth set of studies have focused on collectivism and argued for a more nuanced
understanding of its complexities. In examining Chinese and Japanese collectivism, Dien
(1999), distinguishes between collectivism in China, which is authority-directed while
retaining a strong sense of individuality (hierarchy & uniqueness), and collectivism in
Japan, which is based on a pattern of peer-group orientation. Pirttila-Backman, Kassea and
Ikonen (2004) looked at collectivism and individualism in Cameroon using Triandis’
scales and found that Cameroonians were primarily collectivistic but there was also a
strong strain of individualism, which they called individuality and emphasized the
particularity of the person (thus supporting the idea of separate dimensions of
individualism and collectivism). Realo and colleagues (Realo, Allik & Vadi 1997; Realo &
Allik 1999) developed a more general framework for thinking about collectivism when
they divided it into peer related collectivism, family related collectivism and society
related collectivism.
A fifth step in understanding individualism/collectivism comes out of Oyserman,
Coon & Kemmelmeier’s (2002) meta-analysis of the literature. In looking at the numerous
studies done on individualism/collectivism, they reviewed and content analyzed the scales
used in the various studies. They found that there were seven individualism components
and eight collectivism components that make up 88% of the items used in the different
studies. The individualism components are: 1) independent [self-reliant] (83% of the
scales), 2) [seeking one’s own] goals (33%), 3) competition (15%), 4) uniqueness (30%), 5)
private (22%), 6) self-knowledge (33%), and 7) direct communication (19%). The
collectivism components were: 1) related [to others] (74%), 2) belong [to groups] (39%), 3)
sense of duty [to groups] (85%), 4) harmony [with groups] (57%), 5) advice [sought from
others] (65%), 6) context [specific] (22%), 7) hierarchy (17%), and 8) [preference for]
groups. Several of these aspects have already been discussed and others will appear in the
future. What is important here is that individualism and collectivism seem to possess a
number of sub-concepts.
A sixth step has come about as a result of scholars attempting to amplify particular
findings in Oyserman, Koon and Kemmelmeier’s (2002) study. First, Green, Deschamps
and Paez (2005) explored three specific dimensions of individualism/collectivism: selfreliance, interdependence, and competitiveness.
Their work yielded four
combinations/typologies of these variables that could be used to characterize countries:
self-reliant/competitive, self-reliant/non-competitive, inter-dependent/competitive, and
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interdependent/non-competitive. Second, Brewer and Gardner (1996) argued for splitting
the concept of collectivism into two aspects, relational collectivism focusing on
interpersonal networks and group collectivism focusing on the group as a whole due to
methodological and conceptual confusion. Brewer and Chen (2007) took this a step further
by crossing the earlier three-part distinction between the individual, relationships and
collectives with a new three part distinction between locus of identity, locus of agency and
locus of obligation thus leading to nine conceptual distinctions between various aspects of
individualism and collectivism.
Figure 4 provides a visual picture of the progression in thinking about
individualism and collectivism. If one were to summarize what can be seen in these studies,
it is that there are a number of things that can make up individualism and collectivism and
that there are some concepts that seem to cut across individualism and collectivism and
combine with them in meaningful ways. It should also be pointed out that these concepts
do not form a neat, conceptually tight framework but instead have some overlapping and
are sometimes represented in different ways.
5.2 Countries’ aggregate scores on various aspects of the dimensions of individualism and
collectivism.
To examine conflict situations in cultures reflecting collectivistic tendencies, it is
necessary to know what countries are viewed as collectivistic especially in light of the new
thinking about individualism and collectivism just discussed. A large number of the
countries classified as collectivistic are in Asia and Africa. The labeling of cultures as
collectivistic or individualistic was first done on a large scale by Hofstede (1980). On the
basis of his research, he provides tables that array countries on a continuum from high
individualism to high collectivism and similarly for the other cultural values. The research
behind these tables was done in the 60s and the 70s, primarily in the business context.
Subsequent studies have not been as comprehensive and usually made comparisons
between only two or three countries.
Hofstede’s original set of scores for countries have taken on a life of their own and
have provided the definitive labels for the categorization of a particular country as
individualistic or collectivistic. Furthermore, a large number of the studies have used
Hofstede’s ratings in a tautological fashion by assuming that since Hofstede labels a
country in a certain way that the country can be treated as an example of collectivism or
individualism and used as a manipulation of the individualism-collectivism variable
allowing subsequent measurement of its assumed effects on other variables. These studies
often overlook precautions that Hofstede and other theorists have specified about the
application of dimensions of cultural values. For example, all cultures have elements of
individualism and collectivism so the ratings should not be thought of as some kind of
absolute characterization of a culture. Furthermore, these are cultural generations, which
may not apply to specific individuals in any culture and finally, that cultures change over
time (Hofstede 1991).
In the original Hofstede study (1980), data was gathered from forty counties but
several prominent countries (e.g. China and Russia) were not included because of political
considerations at the time. For individualism, the U.S. had the highest level of
individualism with a score of 91, Japan was around the middle of the distribution with a
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FIGURE 4
CHANGES IN THE CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM
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score of 46 (the mean was 51), Hong Kong had a score of 25 and Taiwan was on the low
end with a score of 17, which was treated as an indication of a high level of collectivism.
On the dimension of power distance, Hong Kong was moderately high with a score of 68,
Taiwan had a score of 58, Japan had a score of 54 (the mean was 51), and the United States
was lower on the dimension with a score of 40. Later, estimates were made for China,
which gave it a score of 20 on individualism, making it highly collectivistic and a score of
80 on power distance, making it a high power distance country.
While some studies have replicated Hofstede’s findings for particular countries, an
increasing number of studies have noted changes especially whenever any other variables
are added. For example, Marshall (1997) compared New Zealand and Indonesia using
Hofstede’s individualism scales, and found New Zealand to be more individualistic than
Indonesia as expected but when he added in the variable of social class, the picture became
more complex. Generally, he found that the higher the social class, the higher the
individualism rating and at the highest social class level, there was a movement toward
convergence between the two countries.
Koch and Koch (2007) looked at the effects of individualism and collectivism on
cooperative behavior within a single country, China. They started from the assumption that
students from Beijing and a more regional city would differ in their levels of individualism
because of the differences in their economic development. Subsequent findings confirmed
this on the individualism scale but not on the collectivism scale with significant differences
for students from the two cities on individualism scores and in their levels of
cooperativeness. A third study by Pirttila-Backman, Kassea and Ikonen (2004) in
Cameroon, showed significant differences in both collectivism and individualism for
gender (women higher than men on individualism) and region (more urban regions were
higher on individualism). Thus, these studies give reason to pause in applying any single
rating to a country because of the apparent effects of other factors.
A further step in understanding the aggregate values of countries occurred when
Triandis (1988, 1993, 1995) overlaid individualism and collectivism with the ideas of
horizontalness (egalitarianism) and verticalness (hierarchy). For example, Triandis, Chen
& Chan (1998) in looking at a number of countries including the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong
and Korea, found that only Hong Kong was more collectivistic than the others. The most
prevalent cultural orientation was horizontal individualism with the U.S. and Japan as
primarily horizontal/individualistic cultures, while Hong Kong was seen as a
horizontal/collectivistic culture and Korea was seen as balanced between horizontal
individualism & horizontal collectivism. Thus, Triandis’ findings suggest that some
countries that have traditional been contrasted such as the United States and Japan may
actually be closer than thought. Two possible explanations for this are that the Japanese
have changed over time by becoming more individualistic or that the previous research
was conflating two dimensions under the label of a single individualism-collectivism
dimension. When the two dimensions are separated, the similarities (and differences)
between the two countries are easier to see.
As mentioned earlier, Schwartz (1999) in developing his framework, added a
dimension outlining human’s relationship to the physical world (mastery v. harmony) and
splits individualism into intellectual autonomy and emotional autonomy. When using this
framework he found that the three groupings of: 1) the U.S. and Japan, 2) Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and Singapore and 3) China tended to be reasonably similar, especially when
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contrasted with the rest of the world (for example, large parts of Western Europe). The
U.S. and Japan tended toward a combination of a middle level valuation of hierarchy (in
society), moderate levels of affective and intellectual autonomy, and a moderately high
level of mastery. China while similar to the U.S. and Japan in affective and intellectual
autonomy was much higher on hierarchy and mastery while the grouping of Hong Kong,
Taiwan and Singapore was similar to the U.S. and Japan in terms of mastery and hierarchy
but was lower on intellectual affective autonomy and higher on conservativism. Again, the
placement of the U.S. and the values associated with some traditional collectivistic
countries were found to be different than expected.
More recent studies have confirmed what Triandis and Schwartz found and
provided further questions about the traditional placements of countries. For example,
Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002) in their meta-analysis of all of the studies
comparing regions and countries on individualism and collectivism found some evidence
to support Hofstede’s placements and some evidence to question them. They confirmed
that on a general measure of individualism, the United States was higher than Hong Kong,
Taiwan, China, Japan and Korea but was lower than Latin America. However, when
collectivism was considered as a separate general factor, the United States was seen as
being less collectivistic than Taiwan, China and Hong Kong, but more collectivistic than
Japan and the same as Korea.
In addition, the particular scales and resulting components of individualism and
collectivism can affect the way that particular cultures are thought about. For example, in
the case of Japan, Oyserman et al suggest that when differences in individualism between
Japan and the U.S. are found that they lie in the particular values for independence,
personal uniqueness, personal privacy and direct communication. Furthermore, they argue
that when competition is added to the mix, that differences between Japan and the U.S.
disappear, “suggesting that competitiveness is a construct unrelated to IND” (p. 16).
Differences in collectivism also seem to be sensitive to the reliability of the scales used. In
the case of Japan and the U.S., it is when low reliability scales are used that lower U.S.
collectivism scores seems to appear but when high reliability scales are used, the findings
are reversed, i.e. the U.S. is higher on collectivism. It also appears that ratings of the U.S.
as low in collectivism especially in comparison to East Asian countries are accentuated
when items related to group harmony, defining the self in context, and valuing hierarchy
and group goals are used and when scales accentuating a sense of belonging to in-groups
and seeking other’s advice are used, then the differences decrease or reverse. Thus, there
seems to be an interaction between the aspects of individualism and collectivism that are
being measured and how collectivistic certain countries appear.
Finally, Green, Deschamps and Paez (2005) using a taxonomy based on selfreliance, interdependence, and competitiveness, came up with some alternative placements
for various countries. In their corresponding analysis of nations, China was categorized as
a self-reliant/competitive country (even though it also had a large number of selfreliant/non-competitors), Singapore fell in the self-reliant/non-competitive category, and
the U.S., was classified in the interdependent/non-competitive category (even they also
have a high percentage of self-reliant/non-competitors).
Thus, these later studies have demonstrated some correspondence to Hofstede but
they have also demonstrated a number of ways that countries seem to differ from what
Hofstede said (Figure 5). For example, while China does fit expectations in terms of some
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FIGURE 5
CHANGES IN COUNTRY RATINGS ON INDIVIDUAL/ COLLECTIVISM SCALES
OVER TIME
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components such as high levels of hierarchy, greater collectivism on some scales, and less
individualism on some scales, it did not fit expectations in that it is seen as more selfreliant (individualistic), more competitive, and less interdependent than previously thought.
The U.S. fits expectations in being seen as high on individualism scales such as uniqueness
and low on collectivism scales such as preference for working with a group, but it did not
fit expectations in that its autonomy ratings were lower than China and roughly equivalent
to Japan’s while its interdependence ratings were generally higher than China and Japan.
The U.S. also seemed to value competition less than China and maybe less than Japan. It
is hard to say how accurate these conclusions are because of limitations of sample
demographics, the number participants tested and when the data was gathered. However,
it is safe to say that more complex data has revealed a different picture than expected from
the original Hofstede ratings. This leads to two conclusions: 1) that countries change over
time and 2) that the uncovering of multiple aspects of individualism and collectivism has
brought about a more complex and less clear picture of the dimensions of values preferred
by most cultures.
6
HOW DOES ARGUMENT AND THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS RELATE
TO CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN THE CONFLICT PROCESS?
There are a number of hints about how argument relates to dissensus and consensus in the
various cultural studies of conflict. An understanding of the process can be gained by
examining: 1) where and to what degree does conflict and disagreement occur? 2) what
factors affect cultural variations in the argumentative aspects of conflict? and 3) what is the
role of argument (dissensus/consensus) in cultural variations of the resolution of conflict?
6.1
Where does conflict and disagreement occur in relation to cultural variations in
values?
One of the cardinal tenets of theories of cultural value dimensions is that certain cultures
avoid conflict because it is contrary to the values of the culture. If this is true, research
should show less conflict in the culture, or at least less overt conflict. The conclusion from
the early research (such as Hofstede’s) was that conflict and disagreement occurred in
individualistic cultures where open disagreement was acceptable as opposed to
collectivistic cultures that value harmony. One such study suggesting this kind of finding
is Benjamin, Schneider, Greenman and Hum’s (2001) study of conflict and friendship in
Taiwanese and Canadian children. They found that there is a negative correlation between
friendship and conflict for collectivistic Taiwanese children while there is a positive
correlation between conflict and friendship for individualistic Canadian children. This
seems to indicate that conflict is most likely to be found in an individualistic culture and
that its effects are more positive.
However, things are not that simple. In their 1998 study of individual/collectivism
and conflict in 23 countries, Smith, Dugan, Peterson and Leung reported the frequency of
disagreements for the two conflict scenarios that they studied. They found that there was
no significant difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in the frequency
with which conflict occurs within groups, however they did find that conflict with outgroups was more frequent in high power distant cultures than in low power distant cultures.
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They also found that, overall, in-group conflict was more frequent than out-group
disagreement for all types of cultures. Furthermore, none of Hofstede’s dimensions of
cultural variation were related to the occurrence of in-group conflict in collectivistic
countries counter to the long standing expectation that collectivistic cultures value in-group
harmony. These findings are particularly important because it is usually predicted that their
will be less disagreement in collectivistic countries than individualistic countries and that
this will especially be true of in-group disagreement where it is expected that harmony
needs to be maintained. Since in-group conflict was more frequent in collectivistic
societies, something else must be going on other than the expected valuing of harmony and
the suppression of conflict.
What is not clear in the Smith et al (1998) study is what the disagreement looks like.
In their scenarios, participants responded to questions with wording such as “there are
differing opinions in your department,” which does not indicate how overt the
disagreement is (p. 356). In a second study, Nibler and Harris (2003) provide data on
conflict in China and the U. S. where the questions refer to more overt forms of conflict:
do “people in your group disagree about opinions regarding what activities the group”
should do (p. 622)? Their results show that no matter whether the conflict is about tasks or
relationships, or among friends or strangers, the levels of conflict are higher in China than
in the U. S. even though it is less so for task conflict among friends. At this point, there
seems to be evidence that not only is conflict not less in collectivistic cultures, but that it
may even be higher under certain conditions.
One further study speaks to the question of how much conflict exists in
collectivistic societies. Koch and Koch (2007) studied Chinese college students from two
locations in different parts of China, where one location was presumed to be more
individualistic than the other (based on Hofstede’s scales), and found that the more
individualistic participants were more cooperative than the less individualistic students in
what was an out-group situation. Thus, the previous study (Nibler & Harris 2003) showed
that levels of conflict are higher in in-group situations than in out-group situations for both
collectivist and individualist societies, and this study showed that for out-group situations,
the collectivistic participants showed more conflict than the individualistic participants.
On the face of it, these studies seem to contradict the conventional wisdom about
the nature of collectivistic societies. While these findings are significant, it is useful to
explore further the form that conflicts take in these different cultures. In seeking to explain
their results, Nibler and Harris (2003) wonder if the Chinese are more sensitive to group
conflict and see it as being more overt than it is in comparison to the West, while Smith et
al (1998) speculate about whether disagreements in collectivistic cultures are expressed
and handled in “more subtle and indirect ways.” There are two studies that cast some light
on these questions.
Gilfand, Nisshii, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, Holcombe and Dyer (2001), in a study of how
Japanese and Americans cognitively represent conflict situations, found a dimension that
they labeled overt vs. covert, which was used by both American and Japanese participants
in interpreting Japanese conflict episodes. The Americans used it to interpret Japanese
conflict situations as having issues that were not aired openly while the Japanese used it to
interpret their conflict episodes as having open confrontation between parties or not when
status issues was involved.
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In Tjosvold, Hui & Sun’s (2004) second study of undergraduate students in China,
they tested the effects of having a direct discussion/disagreement about issues versus
avoiding the discussion of differences . The variable was manipulated by emphasizing the
importance of direct disagreement and open discussion of views or by emphasizing the
importance of keeping one’s views to themselves and maintaining a strong sense of
agreement. Direct disagreement led to perceived cooperation, curiosity, greater knowledge
of opposing views and more liking of the other. The authors conclude that the “results do
not support traditional theorizing that direct discussion of conflict dis-confirms face for
Chinese….Findings indicate that Chinese people can distinguish between direct discussion
of conflict and dis-confirmation of face and react much differently to them” (p. 367).
These two studies indicate that both Chinese and Japanese participants are able to
distinguish between overt and covert conflict so it may not be simply a matter of sensitivity
and interpretation of what is disagreement and what is overt. The studies also seem to
indicate that overt and covert disagreement is understand and accepted in these two
collectivistic cultures but that covert disagreement may be a viable alternative because
both Americans and Japanese seemed to easily see it presence in Japanese conflicts but
not in U. S. conflicts. Gelfand et al (2001) suggest that since the American participants did
not know that they were evaluating conflict situations from Japan or the U. S., that in the
case of the Japanese conflict situations, “the Japanese stimuli strongly ‘engulfed’ the
perceivers (p. 1068).
Finally, one other study presents an interesting variation on these findings about the
cultural values associated with conflict. Gelfand & Realo (1999) looked at the effects of
accountability on the kind of conflict behavior in negotiation situations involving
individualistic (European Americans and Americans) and collectivistic cultures (Asian
Americans and Estonians). They found that when participants in negotiation scenarios had
a high level of accountability versus a low level of accountability, that their intentions,
behaviors and outcomes conformed in the expected directions to individualistic and
collectivistic values. However, when accountability was low that they went in the opposite
direction from what was expected. So when accountable, the collectivists behaved in a
cooperative fashion and the individualists did not but when accountability was low, the
collectivists were not cooperative but the individualists were.
So, what can be concluded about the likelihood of conflict, argument, and the
con/dis-sensus process in various cultural milieus? First, there seems to be evidence that
conflict and disagreement are likely to occur, especially in an overt form, in an
individualistic culture. Second, there also seems to be some evidence that conflict in an
individualistic culture as opposed to a collectivistic culture has the potential to have more
positive outcomes. Third, the picture is mixed as to how likely conflict is to occur in a
collectivistic culture. The theory of collectivistic values and a number of studies suggest
that conflict is not as likely to occur in collectivistic cultures, however, other studies
suggest that conflict is just as likely to occur, thus the question is still open. It would be
interesting to know how many of the studies are based on perceptions, on assumed cultural
values, on behavioral intentions and on actual behavior. Fourth, there is evidence that an
important distinction in collectivistic cultures is that between overt conflict, covert conflict
and implicit conflict. Fifth, there seems to be clear evidence that there are within country
variations in levels of collectivism and individualism and therefore, variations in the levels
of conflict would also be expected. Sixth, people in collectivistic cultures are capable of
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engaging in direct conflict and discussion in a constructive fashion. And seventh,
accountability seems to be a powerful factor in the way people respond to conflict in that it
makes the cultural values and norms more salient and enforceable.
6.2

Factors Affecting the Cultural Variations in the Argumentative Aspects of Conflict

There seems to be at least five factors that affect the way argument and cultural values
interact in conflict situations (especially for “collectivist” societies): 1) whether the
conflict is with an in-group or an out-group, 2) whether the conflict is over task/intellectual
or relationship/emotional issues, 3) whether the orientation of the participants to the
conflict is cooperative, 4) the degree of imposition involved in the conflict and 5) the way
issues of face are dealt with in the conflict.
6.2.1

In-groups versus Out-groups

First, as has already been touched on, whether the conflict and arguments are with
members of an in-group or an out-group seems to make a difference. Matsunaga (2005), in
a theoretical piece, proposed that collectivistic societies, when dealing with an out-group,
tend to situationally define their self-concept more independently, but when dealing with
in-groups, they tend to define their self-concepts more interdependently. She also argues
that the more salient the group membership, the more likely the person defines themselves
interdependently in in-group situations. The conventional wisdom is that the more
interdependent the person feels, the less likely they are to engage in conflict, but the more
independent they feel, the more likely they are to engage in conflict.
Dolinina and Cecchetto (1998), in a theoretical article focusing on the intercultural
argument situation (which is an out-group situation), contend that the parties can establish
a relationship ranging from that of equality to that of superiority-subordination, with
attendant influences on the levels of politeness used in the resulting argument situation.
There is also an implication that the more equality present, the higher the probability of
conflict. This is counter to Smith et al’s (1998) finding that power distance affects the
degree of disagreement found in out-group relations with more disagreements occurring in
high power distance countries. It is also of interest in Smith et al’s study that conflict
within in-groups is more frequent than that with out-groups for all cultures and that
individualism and collectivism does not predict its frequency. Koch and Koch (2007) also
looked at out-group situations, and found that the higher the individualism score in China,
the more cooperative the behavior in conflict situations and the lower the individualism
score, the more likely the conflict with out-groups.
Tjosvold in two studies looked at the interaction between Chinese employees and
foreign and Chinese managers (in-group and out-group situations). In the first study, Chen,
Tjosvold and Fang (2005) looked at the out-group relationship between Chinese employees
and foreign managers (American and Japanese). They found that when the manager
employed a cooperative approach (integrated different views to find a mutually beneficial
solution) to Chinese workers as opposed to a competitive approach (forced others to
conform to their own view) or an avoidance approach (tried to smooth over the conflict),
that it strengthens their relationship and improved productivity.
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In the second study, Chen and Tjosvold (2007) looked at both foreign and Chinese
managers. They found that quality leader-member relationships-LMX (in-group relations
with employees are characterized by “high levels of information communication, mutual
support, informal influence and trust) promoted constructive controversy and rewards for
the employee for both sets of managers. They also found that personal guanxi (an informal
relationship built on social occasions such as lunches and gift-giving where promises are
exchanged for doing favors for each other) was viewed by employees as a factor in
building constructive controversy with their managers (both foreign and Chinese) but that
it did not predict constructive controversy for foreign managers even though it did for
Chinese managers. The out-group situation creates barriers that are harder to deal with than
in in-group situations so it was probably harder for a foreign manager and a Chinese
employee to develop personal guanxi.
Thus, again the picture is mixed about how in-groups and out-groups affect conflict.
Traditional views from a number of research traditions would posit that there is greater
likelihood of conflict with out-groups than with in-groups, no matter the type of culture
(e.g. social identity theory and contact hypothesis work). When the situation is expanded to
look at variations in cultural values, it has been argued that this finding should even be
truer in collectivistic cultures than individualistic cultures because of the importance of ingroup harmony in collectivistic cultures (Hofstede 1980; Ting-Toomey 2003). However,
these studies cast some doubt on the received wisdom in so far as whether the amount of
in-group conflict differs between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. For out-group
conflict, there is some evidence to support the collective wisdom but even more so for
power distance (horizontal/vertical) than collectivism and individualism where a
hierarchical or high power distance culture seems to promote more conflict with outgroups.
6.2.2

Task/Intellectual issues versus Relational/Emotional issues

Second, it makes a difference in the argumentation as to whether the conflict is primarily
centered on intellectual/task issues on one hand or emotional/relational issues on the other
hand. Gilfand et al (2001) found that American participants construed both American and
Japanese conflict episodes using a dimension that they called intellectual v. emotional. In
both cases, the high end of this dimension had to do with conflicts where emotions such as
feelings of jealousy, pain, frustration, guilt and shame were present. The low end of the
dimension had to do with conflict over facts such as “who did what to whom.” While the
author’s distinguish between the American’s construal of intellectual v. emotional and the
Japanese construal of giri violations, they actually may be tapping into similar dimensions.
The Japanese concept has questions of honor and dignity on one end of the scale and
questions of sense of duty and obligations on the other end of the scale. The Japanese
seem to be treating questions of honor and dignity in an emotional sense and questions of
duty and obligation in an intellectual sense.
The Nibler and Harris (2003) study has clearly differentiated variables related to
task conflict (“disagreements about fact or opinion”) and relationship conflict
(disagreements related to personal issues not related to the task), which correlate strongly
with the intellectual and emotional. They found that Chinese participants reported higher
levels of both task and relationship conflict than did Americans, and that friends reported
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greater relationship and task conflict than did strangers even though this was primarily for
the American participants. They also found that there was a negative correlation between
relationship conflict and group effectiveness overall.
The authors interpret their results as suggesting a task conflict advantage, where
“group members feel comfortable enough to freely express and exchange opinions and
disagree with each other to achieve optimal outcomes,” but only for individualistic cultures
(p. 613). While the results are not totally clear, there are some intriguing suggestions to
consider in that the Chinese participants had higher levels of conflict, both relational and
task, than did the American participants and second, the American outperformed the
Chinese on all measures of group efficiency. This is probably not any measure of
American superiority, but it does suggest some interesting questions. Does relationship
conflict have a generally negative effect on the nature of the group’s interaction and its
outcome? Is it harder for people to separate relational conflict from task conflict in
collectivistic societies? Have Americans had more practice dealing with overt conflict?
Tjosvold and Sun (2000) in studying Chinese businesspeople found that the way
that person or relationship conflict is dealt with has a much stronger effect on the outcomes
of the conflict than does the handling of task or intellectual issues. When the person and
relationship was affirmed (versus dis-confirmed), the outcomes of the conflict were
positive.
Thus, there seems to be evidence that cultures distinguish between conflict issues
that have to do with the task and those that have to do with the relationship. Furthermore,
conflict centered on relationships seems to have a greater potential for negative outcomes,
especially in collectivistic cultures. Finally, task conflict, under the right circumstances
may have a positive effect on outcomes.
6.2.3

Conflict Orientation

Third, the kind of conflict orientation present in the situation can affect the type of con/dissensus process in subsequent arguments, especially when the conflict is overt.
Traditionally, the conflict literature has distinguished between cooperative behavior and
competitive behavior in negotiations. Deutsch (1973), in his classic studies of conflict and
bargaining, distinguished between competition where each individual’s goals are mutually
exclusive and cooperation where individuals perceived that reaching their goals depends
on the other. Most of these studies work from the point of view that cooperation yields
better results than competition.
Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson & Sun (2006) have challenged this view in the crosscultural context with the idea of constructive competition, which they distinguish from
destructive competition. Many studies utilizing competition have operationalized
competition in such negative terms that it cannot help but be destructive, e.g. “negotiating
with you is a major waste of time” (Olekalns, Robert, Probst, Smith & Carnevale 2005).
Constructive competition is viewed as a conflict between people that is competitive but is
managed constructively, e.g. effectively completing the task, enjoying the competition etc.
Thus, three possible orientations to conflict in China have been established: cooperative,
constructive competition, and destructive competition with two of them having possible
positive outcomes.
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6.2.4

Politeness

Fourth, politeness theory has been used in a lot of cross-cultural research because it seems
to suggest a range of possible argumentative behaviors that can fit the values and norms of
a particular culture. The theory itself does not deal with conflict or different cultural value
dimensions, but researchers have extended the theory to these situations. In general, they
believe that the more collectivistic the culture, the greater the level of politeness that is
used. In addition, they posit a set of conditions such as the level of imposition on the other
and the level of obligation to the other person as factors that will determine what politeness
strategy is used by a person. As part of the theory, a number of the conditions are seen as
threatening to others and thus have an implicit level of conflict involved in them.
Bresnahan and a series of colleagues have tried to explore these constraints in three
collectivistic cultures, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, but have found the results to be very
complex and not totally understandable. In one part of the study, Bresnahan, Ohashi, Liu,
Nebashi and Liao (1999) found that the higher the level of imposition in the request, the
more likely that participants would refuse the request and thereby trigger a level of explicit
conflict. However, they also found that Chinese in Singapore were more likely to respond
favorably to a request, thereby avoiding conflict, while Chinese in Taiwan were more
likely to refuse the request but with a number of tactics that employed higher levels of
politeness and indirectness to defuse the conflict. What is significant here is that the two
favored ways of responding to the situations with the most conflict potential were to avoid
them or to use high levels of politeness and indirectness so as to defuse the potential
conflict. Thus, politeness research, though limited in its research framework, seems to
suggest the use of more covert ways of dealing with potential conflict.
6.2.5

Face

Closely related to the work on politeness is that of face. Face seems to have an important
effect on argument and conflict, especially in collectivistic situations. Dolinina and
Cecchetto (1998) argue that the introduction of intercultural variables (out-group) into
argument situations demands that face become part of the argumentative considerations.
Tjosvold and colleagues have conducted a series of studies looking at the effects of face
and other factors in collectivistic China. In two studies (Tjosvold & Sun 2000; Tjosvold,
Hui & Sun 2004), they found that confirming the other’s face, as opposed to disconfirming
their face, had a significant positive effect on creating cooperative discussion in conflict
situations. According to the authors, affirmation of face seems to promote uncertainty
about one’s own position, exploration and understanding of the other’s position, efforts to
integrate positions, and confidence in the relationship. On the other hand, disconfirmation
of face not only reduced these behaviors but also increased the amount of confrontation in
the negotiation. The affirmation or disconfirmation of position seemed have little effect on
the type of discussion that occurred.
6.2.6

Summary

The five factors discussed in this section can be seen as working together in terms of the
amount of conflict and types of conflict present in a particular set of cultural value
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FIGURE 6
FACTORS AFFECTING THE KIND OF CON/DIS-SENSUS IN CONFLICT
SITUATIONS
1.

IN-GROUPS

OUT-GROUPS

[predict] more conflict in Ind than Coll
[finding] no difference in conflict levels

[predict] more conflict in Ind
[finding] more conflict in Coll
[finding] more conflict in Hi Power Distance

[finding] more conflict in in-groups than out-groups
2.

TASK/INTELLECTUAL ISSUES

[finding] more conflict for Coll than Ind

3.

COOPERATIVE

RELATIONSHIP/EMOTIONAL ISSUES
[finding] more conflict for Coll
[finding] less conflict is resolved for Coll

COMPETITIVE(Constructive)

(Destructive)

[finding] cooperation leads to more positive outcomes than competition
[finding] constructive competition can lead to more positive outcomes than destructive
competition in collectivistic cultures
4.

LOW LEVELS OF POLITENESS

HIGH LEVELS OF POLITENESS

[predict] collectivistic cultures will use more politeness and have less conflict
[finding] collectivistic cultures use various politeness strategies to avoid conflict
Taiwan—refusal of request (conflict potential) with several high levels of politeness
Singapore—respond positively to request and thereby avoid conflict
5.

FACE CONSIDERED

FACE NOT CONSIDERED

[predict] face is likely to be considered more in collectivistic than individualistic
[predict] face is more important in out-group situations
[finding] in collectivistic society, confirmation of face has positive outcomes
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dimensions (Figure 6). Overall, collectivistic cultures seem to have more conflict in both
in-group and out-group situations and the conflict seems to be less beneficial to the
outcome of the situation. This simple fact makes conflict seem threatening to a culture,
which leads it to interpenetrate its views of conflict with the collectivistic norms about
harmony. However, the other factors suggested in this section may provide some ways to
make the conflict more useful to the culture. The research seems clear that relational
conflict is more destructive so steps to alleviate relational problems or shift the conflict to
task issues seem to be beneficial. In addition, certain kinds of cooperative orientations
seem to lead to better outcomes. Finally, the types of politeness strategies available may
make it possible to address face issues in a less direct fashion and thereby blunt some of
the destructive elements of the conflict.
6.3
The role of argument, the con/dis-sensus process, and varying cultural values in
the resolution of conflict
The role and process of argument in the resolution of conflict under differing cultural value
dimensions can be explored in two ways. First, there is a large literature on how people in
different cultures prefer to resolve conflicts. In most of this literature, the communicative
aspects and argument processes are not spelled out very well but some of the studies about
the ways that argument can work in conflict situations under conditions of varying cultural
value dimensions. Second, there are a few studies that go into more detail about the
argumentative processes in the resolution of conflict, which give us a more detailed picture
of the process.
6.3.1 Studies with hints about the argumentative role of the con/dis-sensus process in
conflict resolution.
First, in studies about how people in different cultures resolve conflict, there are a number
of hints at how the argument process works. For example, Gelfand, Nishii, Ohbuchi,
Fukuno, Holcombe & Dyer (2001) studied a number of Japanese and American conflict
episodes and had Japanese and American participants evaluate them to understand their
representations of conflict. They found that both groups, for all of the scenarios, used a
universal value dimension based on the dimension of compromise v. win and while the
dimension is universal, the Japanese, in line with their collectivistic orientation, interpreted
things in terms of compromising as opposed to winning while U.S. participants, in line
with their individualistic cultural values, thought about conflict in terms of winning as
opposed to compromising. Note that this discussion can supply the opposite sides of a kind
of competition/cooperation dimension and is in line with the conventional thinking about
conflict and cultural values.
There were also two specific frameworks that cut across both cultures even though
they did not apply to all scenarios. Both the Japanese and Americans used a self
framework to interpret U.S. conflict scenarios in a negative light (Japanese-differentiating
of self from others and U.S.-infringements to self) and also both groups used an overt v.
covert framework for interpreting Japanese conflict scenarios as previously discussed
(section 6.1). Finally, they also found that Americans tended to use a culture specific
intellectual v. emotional framework for interpreting conflict while the Japanese also used a
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culture specific giri violation framework (duty to repay obligations and to maintain one’s
reputation) for interpreting conflict scenarios. If all of these frameworks results are
examined closely, they seem to be stereotypic interpretations of conflict in Japan and the
U.S. and two elements of the study’s design add to the feeling of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
First, this is a perceptual study so we do not know whether these judgments would
correspond to behavior and second, the labeling items for the ratings of conflict
dimensions of similarity and difference were provided by the researchers based on
previous studies and sociological theories about Japan and the U.S. So, it is hard to know
how much confidence to place in these results but it is clear that the framework shows a
sensitivity to the way conflict plays out (win/overt versus compromise/covert) and a
sensitivity to how others react to the conflict (self, emotions etc.). Furthermore, all of these
frameworks have been previously discussed in this paper.
A traditional view is represented also in the views of Gudykunst and the research of
Ting-Toomey. In discussing the relationship between individualism/collectivism and the
communicative aspects of conflict, Gudykunst (1998) argues, based on Ting-Toomey
(1985, 1988), that individualistic cultures perceive conflict as instrumental and prefer
direct styles of dealing with it while collectivistic cultures perceive it as expressive and
prefer indirect styles of dealing with conflict such as the use of mediators.
Ting-Toomey, in her Theory of Face Negotiation, provides an overarching and
traditional framework for looking at interactive strategies for solving conflicts. She
postulates that all people are concerned with face especially in probablematic situations
such as conflict and that variations in cultural values influence the use of various facework
and conflict styles. She also argues that people negotiate to resolve conflict through
strategies such as dominating (the use of tactics that push one’s own position as the
expense of the other), integrating (a concern for a solution that shows high concern for self
and for other), obliging (a high concern for other’s interests beyond your own),
compromising (give and take concessions to reach a middle point solution), or avoiding
(eluding the conflict in some way) (1988, 2003; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel 2003). She argues
that people in individualistic cultures prefer direct styles such as integrating or
compromising while people in collectivistic cultures prefer indirect styles such as obliging
or avoiding. Finally, in line with her work, Cole (1990) reports that European Americans
tend to use integrating and obliging styles with members of in-groups while Japanese in
the U.S. use obliging styles with in-group members and dominating styles with out-group
members.
In a general sense, Ting-Toomey’s framework makes sense, but there are variations
even in the Cole study, and a number of studies that suggest that things are more
complicated especially in the so-called collectivistic cultures. The following three sets of
research suggest some interesting variations from the usual ways of thinking.
First, a set of studies about the ways that multiple countries try to resolve conflict
situations provides some interesting results about specific behaviors. Smith, Dugan,
Peterson and Leung’s (1998) 23 country study of the relationship of individualismcollectivism (and Hofstede’s other dimensions of cultural values) to the handling of
conflict and disagreement showed that in individualistic countries, there was tendency to
rely on one’s own experience and training in dealing with conflicts, while in collectivistic
countries, there was more of a tendency to rely on formal rules and procedures no matter
whether dealing with in-group or out-group events.
31

MICHAEL DAVID HAZEN
Metcalf, Bird, Shankarmahesh, Aycan, Larimo and Valdelamar (2006) studied
cultural tendencies in negotiation behavior for five countries, three of which would
traditional be labeled as collectivistic (India, Mexico and Turkey) and two of which would
be labeled as individualistic (Finland and the U. S.). They studied ten dimensions of
business negotiation behavior and while most of them relate to one of Hofstede’s
dimensions in some way, a couple of dimensions will be singled out for discussion. On the
dimension of attitude toward the negotiation, the responses from the U. S., Finland and
Mexico clustered toward a win-win attitude and while India and Turkey showed the largest
percentage of responses for a win-lose attitude and only Turkey lacked a sizable group of
win-win responses. On the personal style dimension, Finland and the U. S. tended more
toward the informal while India, Turkey and Mexico tended more toward the formal. And
finally, in terms of communication, Turkey, India and Mexico show a strong preference for
a direct style while the U. S. and Finland were more indirect even though only relatively.
These findings are particularly interesting because they show some unexpected results.
For example, there is much less competition exhibited than usually assumed for all
countries and the U.S. and Finland have the least amount of competitive behavior which is
usually not expected of individualistic countries. In addition, the collectivistic cultures
seem to have a greater preference for direct communication than the individualistic
cultures. To some degree, these results sound like out-group situations but the study is not
clear about this issue.
Second, several studies focus on specifically exploring conflict in the context of
collectivistic societies. Jabs (2005) explored conflict in Uganda, looking at the patterns of
conflict response styles among literate and non-literate individuals in a rural part of
Ugandan society. She finds that the initial response style of the non-literate people is
generally dominating and competing rather than the expected collectivistic tendencies
toward accommodation and avoiding. Furthermore, she found that there was little concern
for facework among the non-literate people, rather they felt that embarrassment was good
for the other party. Only among the literate people was their an initial response of using
third party help, which is more in line with traditional collectivist practices, however, as
the conflict moved along, the non-literate used third party help in almost all cases to
resolve the conflict but the literate move toward more use of direct means of resolution.
There is also a third set of studies that have their origin in Brown and Levinson’s
Politeness Theory (1978). Kim (2003) has taken elements of Politeness Theory and
created what she calls the Theory of Conversational Constraints. She believes that how
something is said is influenced by cultural concerns for: 1) clarity, 2) minimizing
imposition on others , 3) consideration for the feelings of others, 4) risking disapproval for
self, and 5) effectiveness. Minimizing imposition, consideration for the feelings of others
and risking disapproval of self are considered to be related to collectivistic cultures and
clarity and effectiveness are considered to be related to individualistic cultures.
Miyahara, Kim, Shin & Yoon (1998) utilized elements of the Theory of
Conversational Constraints to examine the degree to which participants saw conversational
constraints as operating in conflict situations involving two cultures that are traditionally
classified as collectivist, Japan and Korea. The concern that most directly relates to
collectivistic harmony, concern for not hurting the feelings of others, was not significantly
different between the two groups and both cultures rated the concern only slightly above
the neutral point (neither agree or disagree with the statement). The most important
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concern for both groups was that of clarity and the most significant difference occurred
here with the Japanese’ greater concern for clarity than the Koreans however, both groups
rated it on the agree side. For the other two constraints, avoiding imposition on the other
and avoiding being disliked, the Koreans had a higher rating than the Japanese but neither
were on the agree side of the continuum and the Japanese were actually on the disagree
side. While the authors interpret these results as meaning that the Koreans are more
collectivistic than the Japanese, in reality, not only are there differences between these two
traditional collectivistic cultures but neither of them are particularly strong in their
collectivistic orientation and the Japanese may actually be more individualistic.
If the results of these studies are examined closely (Figure 7), it can be seen that
while there is some support for generalizations about conflict resolution styles in
collectivistic and individualistic cultures that there are also findings that do not fit, e.g.
higher preference for private discussion in individualistic cultures and the higher use of
win-lose strategies in some collectivistic cultures. While an extended discussion could
follow about why these differences exist, it is more useful in this paper to treat these
differences as possible ways that argument and con/dis-sensus process can work in various
cultures. It is not being suggested that they always do operate in these different ways, but
only that this research raises the possibility and that, as has been shown in some cases, they
may involve special conditions.
6.3.2 Studies about the argumentative role of the con/dis-sensus process in conflict
resolution.
There is a second set of research studies that go into more detail about how the process of
conflict works in different cultural settings. Whereas the previous studies provided general
strategies for resolving conflict, these studies examine particular communicative behavior
allowing us to see how argument and the con/dis-sensus process works in combination
with different dimensions of cultural values.
Nibler and Harris (2003), in their study of the group performance of American and
Chinese student friends and strangers, examined a series of process measures to help
explain the relationship between their conflict and performance findings. The Chinese
groups experienced high levels of personal and task conflict and performed poorly while
the groups of American friends performed well and “benefited from an uninhibited
exchange of individual ideas and opinions.” The American groups tended to use process
methods such as coming to complete agreement, which led the researchers to conclude that
they were “more inclined to use member interaction in their decision making,” whereas the
Chinese groups made more use of majority rule and a long discussion with a vote, which
led the researchers to conclude that they used structured methods and were less inclined to
seek a consensus.
Studies by Tinsley (2001, 1998) explored the negotiation strategies used by
American, German and Japanese business people in a business conflict negotiation
situation. An interesting picture emerged of the strategies used by the three sets of
negotiators, who represented countries with different sets of cultural values. The Japanese
were posited to have the following cultural values: low individualism/high collectivism
(value relationships with various collectivities and align their goals with the in-group), low
polychronicity (value dealing with a single thing at a time), low explicit contracting (value
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FIGURE 7
THE EFFECTS OF FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT ON
ARGUMENT BEHAVIOR UNDER DIFFERING CULTURAL VALUE SYSTEMS
INDIVIDUALISTIC

COLLECTIVISTIC

1.
Face
[predict] high self face concern
high other face concern
[finding]
high mutual face concern for both
[finding] higher self face concerns
[finding] higher other face concerns
but significance marginal and
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indirect and informal communication), and high hierarchy (value social stratification and
status distinctions). The picture of their argumentative strategies from the findings is one
where there are a limited number of strategies used with the greatest emphasis on threats
based on status and power and some appeals to the nature of the rules. The rest of the time,
the Japanese negotiator used non-offensive strategies such as positive statements, requests
for information and things that the researchers were not able to classify.
The Germans were posited as having cultural values that emphasized high explicit
contracting (value overt codes and communication), moderate individualism (value
autonomy and self goals), moderate polychronicity (value multi-tasking), and low
hierarchy. The German negotiator’s use of argumentative strategies from the findings is a
little more varied and veiled than the Japanese, but they ultimately has some similarities.
The negotiator is most likely to appeal to some kind of rule or regulation and may fence
with the other by using positive statements and sometimes negotiating for a deal involving
both parties’ interests. But there is also a willingness to use negative statements and make
threats from a position of power and status.
The American negotiators were posited as working from cultural values of high
individualism, moderate polychronicity, moderate explicit contracting and low
hierarchy/egalitarianism. Their use of strategies from the findings was the most varied in
terms of the options used and in the number of times each of the strategies was used. The
two highest strategies were positive statements and appeals to rules and, on occasion, an
appeal to status and power, but they also made heavy use of attempts to argue for positions
that take into account the others interests, ask questions and interrupt.
Tinsley’s studies show three different patterns of negotiation strategies that imply
different uses of argument. It is interesting to note the important role of rules for the low
and moderate individualistic groups which echoes the findings in the Smith et al and the
Nibler and Harris studies.
The third set of studies, dealing with conflict processes, were done by Tjosvold and
his colleagues. Tjosvold’s set of studies suggest that the levels of conflict are higher than
expected in China and that there are several ways of dealing with the conflict that reveal
interesting argumentative techniques for both dissensus and consensus. Tjosvold and Sun
(2000) show that face is an important consideration in conflict in China. Both this study
and his 2004 study (Tjosvold, Hui and Sun) show that if face is confirmed at the beginning
of the conflict then it opens up the interaction to disagreement and constructive behaviors.
Furthermore, in the 2004 study, they demonstrated that if face confirmation is combined
with direct controversy (rather than avoidance of controversy) then constructive debate can
ensue that leads to productive outcomes. In their 2000 study, they describe this as “open
discussion of differences” and in their 2004 study, they describe this as “openmindedness.” What is intriguing here are their descriptions of constructive conflict. In both
studies, they see constructive conflict as involving such things as questioning and
uncertainty about one’s own views and position; exploring the other’s views and positions;
asking questions; the ability to identify the other’s positions; mutual interest in each other’s
positions; less confrontation when disagreeing; more cooperative goals; and efforts to
integrate their different views.
Up to this point, Tjosvold’s emphasis was on demonstrating that cooperative
conflict could and does occur among the Chinese. In a 2006 study, Tjosvold, Johnson,
Johnson and Sun went further to develop the idea of constructive competition in China.
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They found evidence that if an internal motive to compete existed and a strategy of
competing fairly (use of equity rule) was used, that these served as powerful influences on
the constructiveness of competition. However, things such as task and ego motives,
extrinsic motivation and the strategy to obstruct did not contribute to constructive
competition. When constructive competition was present, they described it in terms of the
experience of engaging in competition, enjoying the competition, wanting to participate,
effectively completing the task, feeling supported and capable, and interacting positively
with competitors.
Thus, Tjosvold and his colleagues seem to be suggesting that in a collectivistic
society such as China, that there are factors that can lead to the productive use of
disagreement and competition in conflict situations. In fact, these considerations are not a
lot different from those needed in non-collectivistic societies for the effective use of
dissensus in argumentative conflicts.
A number of conflict studies have moved beyond the cultural values present in the
situations studied and beyond the factors affecting conflict to looking at the particular
argumentative and communicative strategies used in the conflicts (Figure 8). Thus, we can
see a chain of research that starts with the question of where conflict occurs in different
cultures, moves to variations in cultural values associated with the conflict, continues with
general factors that can affect the way the conflict plays out, and finally, leads to the
global and specific strategies used in the conflicts.
7.
WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS, ARGUMENT AND CULTURAL
VALUE VARIATIONS?
The drawing of conclusions from an analysis that has shown as many inconsistencies as
consistencies in the theory and research can only be tentative at best, particularly when
some of the conclusions have not been tested yet. A start point is to consider the following
two descriptions:
1.
Argument in organizations that can lead to good decision-making is characterized
by interaction over competing claims, the tension of ideas, opportunities for collective
disagreement, social comparison and idea testing, a context of good will, and a
commitment to shared procedural rules.
2.
Constructive interaction in the business setting involves exploring the other’s views
and positions, asking questions, questioning one’s own positions, mutual interest in each
other’s positions, enjoying competition, interacting positively with competitors and efforts
to integrate different views.
Of course, the first description comes from Valuing Dissensus Project’s ideas about
what dissensus should involve in an organization and the second description comes from
Tjosvold’s research on business in China where he describes the characteristics of
constructive competition that leads to positive outcomes. The first project has at times
seemed a logical extension of western individualism in the theoretical confines of
argumentation theory and the second project seems to suggest bold new ideas about the
effective functioning of business in the collectivistic confines of the People’s Republic of
China. However, what is most striking are the similarities in the two descriptions despite
the alien worlds that they inhabit.
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FIGURE 8
ELEMENTS OF ARGUMENT IN THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AS USED IN
CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES ACROSS CULTURES
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These two statements represent ideals in both of their worlds, but they also
represent what can be, so it is important to know what fosters them. However, it is also
important to explore what falls in between as has been attempted in this paper. Despite the
lengthy excursions into detailed bodies of research, the goal of this paper, all along, has
been to look for the confluences between the idea of dissensus as conceptualized in the
con/dis-sensus process and as situated in the argumentative discourse of differing cultural
value systems. At this point, it is incumbent to advance some tentative “probes” for
consideration in an attempt to make sense out of this paper’s lengthy discussions.
First, since disagreement is one of the fundamental human orientations toward life
and other people, it is present in all cultures. This statement should be a truism but at times,
the literature on cultural variations in values and beliefs appears to suggest otherwise.
People have different opinions, people have different interests, and people have different
experiences, which provide the grounds for disagreement as suggested by theorists such as
Burke (1969) and revisionist researchers such as Smith et al (1998).
Second, there may be various forces in different societies that work against the
expression of disagreements such as authoritarian governments, hierarchical societies, the
use of status power and the fear of offending others. Several of these factors have become
apparent in this analysis but the most vivid reminder is Gelfand and Realo’s finding about
the effects of accountability on the expression of individualistic and collectivistic values.
In collectivistic societies, when people are accountable, they are less likely to express
disagreement. From this study, it appears that the following factors can inhibit the direct
expression of disagreement: in-group hierarchies, relational face issues, accountability,
concern for being liked, concern for avoiding imposition, and concern for the feelings of
others.
Third, as a result of these forces inhibiting the expression of disagreement, there
exist a range of argumentative forms beyond the ideals presented at the beginning of this
conclusionary discussion. It is tempting to try to develop an explicit taxonomy of
possibilities but at this point in time, it is more useful (and safer) to present a few possible
frameworks. The simplest framework is probably to distinguish between direct
disagreement, indirect disagreement and the avoidance of disagreement. Such distinctions
have been used by some scholars to distinguish between individualistic and collectivistic
cultures, but as can be seen in this paper’s discussions, that is too simplistic. Studies have
revealed situations where cultures that were thought to be individualistic used more
indirect forms of disagreement than were expected and similarly, collectivistic cultures
used more direct forms of disagreement than were expected. Furthermore, some scholars
have conceptualized disagreement as competition, which they see as independent of the
traditional ways of thinking about individualism and collectivism.
One of the possibilities suggested by the direct, indirect and avoiding framework, is
the idea of indirect argument. At first glance, this may seem antithetical to the con/dissensus process with its emphasis on direct, open disagreement. What would indirect
argument mean? It would mean a process where disagreement and the expression and
consideration of various ideas would not be explicitly visible in the language of the
exchange. While the argument would not necessarily be clear and understood by someone
not involved in the exchange, it would be quite clear to those involved. By using indirect
forms of language and expression, a cloud of deniability envelopes the interaction thereby
protecting the face of those involved. Such processes at least theoretically exist in ideas
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like the ringi process in Japan and the various satirical and editorial commentary processes
in the former Soviet bloc (Hazen 1989). A further resource for consideration of indirect
argument is Hall’s idea of message contextuality (ranging from high to low), where as the
amount of contextuality in the message increases, more and more of the information and
meaning is carried in the various contextual elements and not the explicit message (Hazen
& Fourcade 2007).
Fourth, even if the interaction takes a direct or indirect form of disagreement, there
are a number of ways that people can seek to resolve the conflict. However, conflict
resolution taxonomies are even more fraught with conceptual minefields than those related
to expression of disagreement. As a result of the numerous attempts to define conflict
resolution strategies in different cultures, labels for strategies have proliferated in the
literature, e.g. win-win, win-lose, compromise, dominating, integrating, competitive,
cooperative, obliging etc. For purposes of understanding argumentative possibilities for the
resolution of disagreement in various cultures, the following simple framework should
serve as a useful starting point: 1) approaches using open interaction such as competition
or cooperation, 2) approaches using some set outside criterion to resolve the conflict such
as rules and procedures, structured interactions, or power and status, and 3) approaches
that function in some indirect fashion such as covert interaction, or avoiding. This
framework incorporates a number of the options that have been discussed and can be
thought of as involving dimensions of directness and of the evaluation of issues and
positions.
Fifth, despite the possibilities of different kinds of disagreement and the different
approaches to resolving them, there do seem to be a series of factors that can push the
disagreement process in directions that can be deemed “constructive,” especially in
collectivistic societies. Thus, factors such as whether the disagreement is with people in
out-groups or in-groups, whether the disagreement is over task or relational issues, whether
the persons have a cooperative orientation of some kind, whether politeness levels are used
and whether face is taken into account can have positive or negative consequences for the
expression of disagreement and for the outcome of the disagreement. For example, Nibler
and Harris (2003) in their study of Chinese and American conflict, suggest the idea of a
“task conflict advantage” where “group members feel comfortable enough to freely
express and exchange opinions and disagree with each other.” However, they see this as
possibly a culture specific effect because it seemed to only occur for the Americans and
not the Chinese. The Chinese, despite high levels of task conflict, were not able to achieve
positive group outcomes, which the authors’ attribute to the high level of relationship
conflict and the inability to resolve it. Some support was found for this in Tjosvold and
Sun’s (2000) work with Chinese businessmen, where they found that if the other person’s
face was affirmed, then conflict could have a positive outcome.
Sixth, there is evidence that, despite the ideal nature of the con/dis-sensus process
outlined at the beginning of this section and the factors working against it in some of the
cultural value systems, the con/dis-sensus process can work in any culture under the right
conditions. In this paper, there have been a series of attempts to cite studies and situations
where the process is present and works in collectivistic cultures. Perhaps attention should
also be directed toward individualistic cultures because there are barriers to its effective
operation there also as illustrated by the existence of Willard’s project and the thinking of
other theorists such as Habermas and von Eemeren.
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Seventh, a detailed analysis of the makeup of the various cultural value dimensions
is needed to fully understand how cultures work in practice and to look for the precise
interfacing with elements of an ideal argumentative con/dis-sensus process. Such an
analysis would make clearer not only what argumentative resources are available in
different cultural situations but also which ones have the most likelihood of fostering
constructive argumentative processes. Instead of thinking about cultural argument as a
specific set of discourse forms that have to be used in a particular culture, it is more useful
to think about the argumentative resources that are available in any cultural situation
(Philipsen 2002; Hazen 2006). Some ideas about argumentative resources in terms of
individualism and collectivism are contained in Oyserman et al’s analysis of the role of
different meaning dimensions in studies of Japan and the U. S. For example, individualism
in terms of the uniqueness of the individual seems to be a key distinction between Japan
and the United States, thus it would be expected that arguments based on the uniqueness of
the individual would have a strong positive impact on Americans. Similarly, individualism
based on competition also makes a significant difference with Americans being rated
higher on individualism only when competition is not part of the consideration so
presumably, Americans would not respond as well to a competition argument as the
Japanese.
Finally, one last issue needs to be raised but not answered; that is the issue of the
degree of consistency between cultural value dimensions and behavior. A classic issue in
social science is the degree of relationship between cognitions and actual behavior,
however cultural theorists strongly insist that cultural values and behaviors are highly
correlated because of the central importance of the cultural value dimensions to the culture.
The question has been rarely addressed in research but the recent GLOBE studies have
raised the question by creating paired questions for a cultural value and the associated
cultural practices. Their preliminary research seems to indicate that a cultural value and its
related cultural practices are not always highly correlated. It is possible that some of the
findings discussed in this paper, may be related to such distinctions, especially when it is
remembered that the argumentative dimension is usually behavioral and the cultural value
dimensions are usually not behavioral.
link to commentary
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